Defining Clientelism

Historian Richard Graham characterized clientelism as an action-set built upon the principle of “take there, give here,” enabling clients and patrons to benefit from mutual support as they play parallel to each other at different levels of political, social, and administrative articulation.¹ Clientelism involves asymmetric but mutually beneficial relationships of power and exchange, a nonuniversalistic quid pro quo between individuals or groups of unequal standing. It implies mediated and selective access to resources and...
markets from which others are normally excluded. This access is conditioned on subordi-
nation, compliance or dependence on the goodwill of others. Those in control—
patrons, subpatrons, and brokers—provide selective access to goods and opportuni-
ties and place themselves or their supporters in positions from which they can divert
resources and services in their favor. Their partners—clients—are expected to return
their benefactors’ help, politically and otherwise, by working for them at election times
or boosting their patron’s prestige and reputation.

In the political realm, clientelism is associated with the particularistic use of public
resources and with the electoral arena. It entails votes and support given in exchange for
jobs and other benefits. It can become a useful strategy for winning elections and build-
ing political support through the selective release of public funds to supporting politi-
cians and associates or the acceptance of political nominees as personnel in state-related
agencies. It is therefore a strategy of partial political mobilization that differs from more
universal patterns, such as programmatic appeals or mobilization motivated by parties’
achievement records.

Vincent Lemieux claimed that clientelism triggers a “double transformation” in the
statuses of individuals. As clients renounce their autonomy as citizens, patrons leniently
weaken their hierarchical controls. The client gains a measure of dominated power, and
the patron gains a position of dominating authority. Even when binding, these arrange-
ments are not fully legitimate and remain open to attacks from competing networks,
from the mobilization of alternative organizations in civil society, and from central elites
willing to undermine clientelistic controls in the political arena, administration, and
access to economic markets.

Beyond this general understanding, researchers still differ in their assessment of
clientelism and their approach to studying its multifaceted nature, at the crossroads of
politics and administration, economy and society. Is it a form of patrimonial corruption
of public agencies, evident, for instance, when politicians and officials distribute public
services and jobs personally in a restricted, arbitrary, secretive, and unchallengeable
way (particularly important when people cultivate personal connections in horizontal
cliques or vertical clienteles in a context of low institutional trust)? Is it the cause
and/or the result of biased institutional reliability? Should it be studied in the frame-
work of networks, friendship, and exchange or as part of rent-seeking and corrupt
strategies of government functions’ colonization?

Researchers also differ in their view of the institutional viability and significance of
clientelism in late modernity. Many students of clientelism stress that it neutralizes the
system of representation and entitlements by placing associates and friends in strategic
positions of public power and control. From this perspective, clientelism is inimical to
the institutionalization of public accountability and to mechanisms of administrative
control. It leads to overemployment and underqualified personnel in public administra-
tion, biased bidding for public works, and overpricing. Researchers typically mention
secluded negotiations and private deals involving public resources.
In contrast, other scholars emphasize the pragmatic aspects of social action. Clientelism is an important mechanism in obtaining transactional benefits, allocating resources, and articulating local-regional-national relations. While clientelism and patronage run counter to universalistic standards, scholars following this second analytical perspective have claimed that they are nevertheless sensitive to local sentiment and may solve existential problems, provide access for migrant populations, and serve political entrepreneurs. Thus, clientelism and patronage in the form of favors, jobs, or selective development projects may adjust to postmodern conditions and civil society more than is usually expected.

Although in principle postmodern forms of participation are vastly different from their pre-modern counterparts, both stand in sharp contrast to modern institutional forms. Both search for flexible solutions oriented toward individual needs, taking private concerns into consideration and integrating everyday concerns as public issues.  

This article reassesses these issues by reviewing new works on clientelism, stemming primarily from political science but also from history, anthropology, and sociology. It addresses the wider implications of these analyses within the framework of current trends in civil society, democracy, and market economy.

The New Wave of Works on Clientelism

Since the late 1990s there has been an upsurge of works on clientelism. The first wave of research in the late 1960s and early 1970s involved case studies, along with important attempts in conceptualization, carried out particularly by anthropologists and political scientists, including groundbreaking analyses by René Lemarchand, Luigi Graziano, Keith Legg, James Scott, and Carl Landé. Most studies assumed that clientelism and patron-client relationships would eventually disappear in the course of development or democratization. Part of this misconception was due to the perception of clientelism as an archaic phenomenon of traditional and agrarian societies and to the conflation of changes in clientelism with its demise. Indeed, many studies described traditional patron-client relations in peasant societies and among recent migrants to the cities, in situations of extreme scarcity and lack of empowerment that favored the formation of captive agrarian and urban clienteles. A second type of clientelism entailed the distribution of state resources (jobs, contracts, and services) in exchange for political support and was associated with various forms of patron and organizational brokerage. Alex Weingrod conceptualized in sharp lines the contrast between traditional dyadic patronage and modern party-directed clientelism by focusing on the degree of segmentation or integration of local sectors within nation-states. He was one of the first to allude to explicit variables (for example, the scope of exchange, forms of resource control, and
balance between power and instrumental considerations) in distinguishing between different forms of clientelism. This approach reflected and buttressed the typological convictions and developmentalist concerns of his time. Perhaps due to its clear-cut developmental emphasis, his work was a major influence on leading case studies in anthropology, history, and political science for many years.

The second research wave in the 1980s and early 1990s expanded the range of studies, tried to systematize the field, and added historical works tracing clientelism back to early modernity and even antiquity. The implicit assumption of the earlier studies—that clientelism is typical of peripheral and semiperipheral settings—gave way to greater awareness of its ubiquity also in developed democratic and Communist polities. Analytically, research identified clientelism as a model of social exchange and a specific strategy of political mobilization and control. The research community gained a rather comprehensive understanding of clientelism in terms of coalitional strategies, center-periphery relations, and exchanges. Clientelism involves complex (often pyramidal) networks of patron brokerage selectively reaching different strata, sectors, and groups and pervading political parties, factions, and administrations. In many cases clientelism assumes an addendum-like character, ancillary to democratic institutions, and only seldom does it become a major organizational mechanism, as in the decades-long one party rule of the PRI in Mexico. Also, clientelist strategies not only are affected by immediate considerations of power and instrumentality, but often encompass longer evaluations of reciprocal benefits and commitment as the prerequisite to maintain ongoing relationships. Clientelist bonds involve the exchange of instrumental, economic, and political resources interwoven with expectations and promises of loyalty and support, in a type of package deal. No resources are exchanged separately at their simple market value; rather, they are exchanged in a combined deal that imbues them with broader social and political meaning.

Interest in civil society, informal institutions, and citizen-politician linkages rekindled the study of clientelism in the 1990s and early 2000s. Indeed, clientelism runs against the ideal model of democratic life and autonomous civil society, as it has been intensively discussed in the last twenty years. Among the studies, *Le clientélisme politique dans les sociétés contemporaines*, edited by Jean-Louis Briquet and Frédéric Sawicki, *Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation*, edited by Simona Piattoni, and *Poor People’s Politics*, by Javier Auyero, stand out. Auyero’s analysis is rooted in ethnography and portrays from the bottom up the practical, performative, and symbolic aspects of clientelistic relationships that developed between Peronist political activists and their constituencies in contemporary Argentina. The books edited by Piattoni and by Briquet and Sawicki bring together works by political and social scientists, government and organization researchers, and some historians. Piattoni aims explicitly and Briquet and Sawicki implicitly at reaching generalizable arguments on the institutional hold of political clientelism. Countrywide studies, such as Rigby’s and
Afnasiev's analyses of the Russian Communist and postcommunist systems, and regional studies, such as Susana Corzo Fernández's analysis of Andalucía and Michella Morello's study of the Mezzogiorno, are of great interest as well. Mario Caciagli's short theoretical excursus on clientelism, corruption, and organized crime provides a synthetic review of the literature, but its publication in Spanish restricts its impact. Also worth mentioning are various other studies of clientelism in Spain and France, Latin America, and Islamic societies. Beyond their different approaches, ranging from micro-analysis to comparative political studies, most of these books share a concern with clientelism's systemic resilience and contemporary change of format.

The new studies suggest that analysis move beyond formal principles and ideals—universal citizenship, procedural versus participatory democracy—toward the real workings of democracy, citizenship, and civil society. For example, they suggest a focus on patronage practices through tracing identifiable parameters such as the political use of public jobs ("political jobbery") or the biased use of developmental projects as a means of patronage. Some of these works, particularly those dealing with contemporary cases, address the changing role of political clientelism along with recent transformations in civil society, democracy, and market economy. They share the widening understanding that, together with other forms of particularistic engagements, clientelism is an enduring feature of politics; the rising tide of neoliberalism has only increased its presence in many contemporary societies, while in others it may be leading to a more marginal role. These works emphasize that political studies should distinguish between changes in clientelism and the demise of clientelism. They suggest moving beyond an either/or conceptual framework, phrased in terms of presence versus absence of clientelism, to research on patterns of clientelism and patronage amid changing trends in civil society, political institutions, and market economy. They thus search for concrete institutional contexts that favor or constrain clientelism in liberal democracies, postauthoritarian polities, and historical societies.

**Paradigmatic Shifts and Views**

Like other key concepts in the social sciences, clientelism is open to conceptual dispute, paradigmatic disagreement, and empirical debate. It has become increasingly accepted that clientelism is not doomed to disappear but has changed and continues to change, at times in radical ways. Part of this change is due to the democratic empowerment of civil society. Drawing on studies of Brazilian politics, Robert Gay has recently called attention to an interesting phenomenon. As new social movements revolutionalize politics by establishing alternative discursive arenas, challenging dominant practices, and achieving a measure of at least symbolic power, new constituencies committed to the ideal of rights emerge. This change does not eliminate clientelism, but it
reshapes the terms in which relationships are expressed, as well as tactics, from favors in a patrimonial sense to public services that clienteles demand as their own right. In Brazil and probably in other settings as well, clientelism seems to be increasingly a means to pursue the delivery of collective as opposed to individual goods. This means that political clienteles are less likely to assume the form of loose clusters of independently negotiated dyads than organizations, communities or even whole regions that fashion relationships or reach understandings with politicians, public officials and administrations. In other words, contemporary clientelism exhibits both hierarchical and relational elements and elements of collective organization and identity.21

Piattoni, too, in the introduction to Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation, indicates that individuals, at least in Europe, are no longer forced to enter a clientelist deal by material and political circumstances, but rather may choose to do so in order to gain privileged access to public resources.

Moreover, they increasingly do so as members of broader categories of individuals with ground for claiming publicly allocated resources. The patrons, in turn, are no longer secure of their power basis, as this depends on the political consensus that they muster. Nor can they be sure that the “clientelistic deal” will be honored. . . . Once these trends are taken into account—that clientelism is becoming more and more bureaucratized and impersonal and tends to involve entire categories of persons in the role of both patrons and clients, and that enforcement becomes more and more difficult—it becomes increasingly clear that clientelism is but a variant of particularistic politics—“politics as usual,” we would be tempted to say—and that singling it out as cultural pathology and developmental distortion is wrong.22

While formally more personalized and less structured, clientelism, adapted to a democratic context, is thus more like interest groups, political influence, and lobbying. It can therefore be subject to analysis with tools successfully applied to these subjects, such as goal-oriented and cost-benefit approaches and methodologies designed to study competitive market environments.

For instance, Barbara Geddes attempts to bridge structuralist with intentional (rational choice) arguments by analyzing how institutions shape individuals’ incentives in government and how individuals choose policies and actions against this background. More specifically, she tries to understand the politician’s dilemma in patronage-ridden politics: whether to engage in reform or turn posts into political plums. Her study, based on the projection of the prisoner’s dilemma onto the political realm, identifies a tension or contradiction between the politician’s short-term need for political survival and the long-run collective interest in economic performance and improvement of state capacity. The analytical framework then allows for cost-benefit studies of how this tension is played out empirically in various institutional contexts.23 Luis Fernando Medina and Susan Stokes have recently used this approach to assess for Argentina “why might people voluntarily take part in an exchange that most authors claim is bad for them,” instead of supporting more programmatic appeals to prospective policy or past performance by parties.24
As a political practice, clientelism is profoundly marked by the codes of signification of different political and administrative systems and public cultures. Briquet and Sawicki associate the systematization and adaptation of clientelistic practices with the changing capacity of negotiation by political actors and the discourses of public legitimacy that empower voluntary forms of association in the contemporary world. As an intervening variable between institutional arrangements and political outcomes, clientelism is sensitive to both democratic-electoral logic and bureaucratic logic. Consequently, the interplay and sometimes tension between these two logics is reflected in its enactment.25

Another issue derives from clientelism's susceptibility to contradictory interpretations. Past debates disagreed about its relative emotional or coercive character.26 Today, scholars are more willing to contemplate the parallel coexistence of multiple vantage points on clientelistic attachments, partially determined by the institutional matrix and the contrasting interests of patrons and clients. Because it is an informal practice rooted in the interface between the socioeconomic and the political and is at the same time influenced by current discourses, clientelism can be simultaneously represented (and disguised) in contradictory ways. It can be portrayed as lopsided friendship or control mechanism, as commitment or investment, as a favor or means to advance rights and popular demands. As an analyst of Brazilian society puts it:

[T]he problem is that we have become so accustomed to thinking of clientelism as a mechanism of institutional control—often referred to as corporatism—or the product of "false consciousness"—often referred to as populism—that we have failed to consider the possibility that clientelism might be embraced as a popular political strategy. . . . Under such circumstances, clientelism has less to do with the exchange of votes for favors, than with the exchange of votes for what political actors would like to present as favors but the least privileged elements of the population demand or claim as rights.27

This analysis brings into new light the logics of subordination that James C. Scott identified in *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, based upon earlier analyses of forms of control and subordination. In rural Malayan society the shared critique of domination crystallized in hidden transcripts that were typical of social arenas sequestered from the immediate control of the dominant.28 In contrast, in contemporary western polities many individuals entering a clientelistic network enjoy greater leeway and legitimacy to express demands and interests in terms of the powerful idiom of political and civil rights. Yet some of the ambiguity, tensions, contradictions, and plural meanings attributed in the past to the structures of domination, as analyzed by Scott, remain in the new forms of clientelism. Studies of clientelism should pay increasing attention to linguistic disguise, ritual codes, trust and distrust, and widely accepted images of appropriate behavior. These symbolic dimensions affect the struggle for power, the forms of subordination and mobilization, the use and abuse of networks, and the prospects of resistance and rebellion. As clientelism is open to constant challenges and imbalances, renegotiation, and change, research must take into account these...
dimensions of symbolic construction and struggle. Auyero's book makes an important contribution in this direction, because it shows how clientelist networks are constructed, maintained, and "performed" publicly. It indicates that objectively, while these networks attempt to structure an exchange of votes for favors, they are often subjectively experienced as part of a brokers' performance that "explicitly and emphatically den[ies] the political content of their actions."[29]

The new studies of clientelism are also related to widespread reflection on the shortcomings of western parliamentary democracy. Many ask themselves whether parliamentary democracy is the best achievable form of governance. Others decry its erosion, wondering whether the introduction of direct democratic procedures such as citizens' initiatives and referenda could help reduce public apathy and dissatisfaction with politics and politicians and perhaps encourage the growth of committed participation in public life.[30] Many of these analytical approaches and criticisms derive from a widespread drive to measure the realities of political processes against the ideals of democracy, universalism, and citizenship.[31] The study of clientelism is part of a parallel attempt, which should be encouraged, to avoid conflating the political process with the ideas and formal guidelines of democracy or any other political system. Reaching toward the middle ground of effective political processes, studies of clientelism reflect a rising interest in "real" politics and the actual workings of civil society.[32]

### Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation

The book edited by Simona Piattoni reconsiders clientelism within the framework of interests and democratic representation by analyzing the European experience from a historical and comparative perspective. The authors consider that "politics is inherently particularistic and that what makes the difference is how particular interests are presented, promoted, and aggregated," thus recognizing that "a certain degree of particularism in politics cannot be suppressed."[33]

The relationship between accepted political ideologies and forms of particularistic politics is not that of an ideal to its corruption, but rather a dialectical relationship between what is theoretically desirable and what is practically possible. Clientelism is just one of the historical forms in which interests are represented and promoted, a practical (although in many ways undesirable) solution to the problem of democratic representation.[34]

By following Martin Shefter's lead, the contributors attempt to identify both the formative experience and the conditions of transformation and possible demise of clientelism. Shefter emphasized the relative timing of bureaucratization and democratization as central explanatory variables in the likelihood that political parties would employ patronage or make programmatic appeals to the public. While patronage is blocked for "externally mobilized parties," that is, parties that do not occupy positions of power and thus opt for
programmatic appeals, "internally mobilized parties" with a grip on state resources can choose between strategies. The strategy of the latter is conditioned by the structure of broader coalitional politics, which in some cases promotes either "bourgeois autonomy" or "bureaucratic functional autonomy" and thus limits the appeal of patronage. Nonetheless, once in existence, clientelism creates strong path-dependence where it flourished during the formative period of the political system.\textsuperscript{35}

This analytical line is tested in nuanced and rich case studies by the contributors to \textit{Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation}. While the reader may object to the small-N methodology, the case study approach works here at its best, taking into account institutional design and historical timing.

Illustrative is Apostolis Papakostas's analysis of the dearth of clientelism in Scandinavia, in a comparison of Sweden and Greece. Strongly committed "to avoid the tendency of Western intellectuals to contrast idealized political models with corrupt political practices," he suggests that the development and maintenance of universalistic state practices has to be explained as much as the development of particularistic state practices. From a contemporary perspective it is tempting to talk of historical legacies. Papakostas instead looks at Greece and Sweden from the range of possible paths of development in early modern times. "These societies were more similar historically than has been assumed. They have become more different as this spectrum of alternatives was gradually narrowed down to the established alternatives."\textsuperscript{36} He analyzes in detail how both clientelistic and universalistic practices result from different historical sequences and ways of drawing up organizational boundaries among the state, political parties, and social interests and classes. Specifically, Greece adopted modern western institutions at the end of the Napoleonic wars and expanded political representation throughout the nineteenth century through electoral reforms, universal adult male suffrage in 1844, and parliamentary institutions in the 1870s. Western European models gave the state a highly legal-formalistic character. The state was slow in its vertical incorporation of peripheries, whereas partisan mobilization and mediation by parties led by local hierarchies became of paramount importance. It thus became impossible to depersonalize issues and define them bureaucratically. Patronage and political clientelism displaced bureaucratic autonomy along the entire social ladder and sealed the centrality of politics as an entrenched feature of this country's political culture.

In Sweden the expansion of the state and extension of the franchise followed a different institutional sequence. A strong state, with the capacity to collect information and control mass education, taxation, and regulation, predated the adoption of modern democratic practices. State and political parties remained differentiated and separated. As the Swedish state integrated local interests, respecting social hierarchies, the lower classes were insulated, and the role of political parties in mediating between state and society was reduced. Patronage remained restricted to the upper classes and did not expand over the entire society. Political representation, as well, excluded the vast major-
ity of proletarianized peasants and industrial workers. Toward the end of the nineteenth century a broad range of independent political and social movements organized the excluded strata, aggregating citizens' interests.

Later on, when these social organizations became part of the welfare administration, they transmitted the popular proximity that they had already acquired into the welfare state, making for a bureaucracy that was sensitive to popular feelings and yet implemented welfare policies impartially. . . . Citizens' multiple, and in many ways exceptional, demands and needs could thus be transformed into routine cases with few exceptions.37

In Sweden this sequential process shaped differentiation, popular proximity, and bureaucratic impartiality toward citizens. In Greece a patronage-ridden polity crystalized as the state and politics became intertwined. These ties generated state organs' selective approach toward the citizens and gave political entrepreneurs "the opportunity to mediate between the citizen and the indifferent bureaucracy and thus exact a clientelist fee." Thus, "the universalistic tendencies in the Greek state, for long periods, look like islands in a sea of particularistic networks."38

Frank O'Gorman challenges path-dependent arguments that classify societies into those geared toward and those free from patronage and clientelism. Rather than follow path-dependence from initial institutions, he presents the alternative of England: long-term progressive transformations in the use and abuse of patronage until a transition to meritocracy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.39 Change in politicians' use of budgets to reward followers and win "friends" was gradual. It began within the governing establishment itself, as a political response to public outcries against the perceived corruption that accompanied the loss of the American colonies in the 1770s. It thus preceded the emergence of mass politics and mass political parties. With the growing importance of information in the rapidly multiplying clubs of England, the reform of the state administration was adopted to placate a wider public opinion and, by doing so, maintaining the confidence of the public in the social and political elite. . . . By the middle of the nineteenth century the governing establishment was satisfied that political stability could be maintained by a range of alternative strategies, including extensions of the electoral franchise, the mobilization of mass political parties, the modernization of local government, and, not least, the meritocratic system of appointment to and promotion in the public administration.40

The timing and sequencing of processes thus seem to be crucial in the articulation of clientelism. They create a certain balance between broad and limited access to politics and public spheres, between centralization and decentralization of decision making, and especially between the relative empowerment of political forces opposing and supporting clientelism.41

The case studies in Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation are hardly generalizable by themselves. Nonetheless, the authors have developed a common
vocabulary and shared approach to the study of clientelism, and the book offers coherent, important insights for a wide spectrum of cases in Europe. Included are Sweden, the Netherlands, France, and Iceland, along with the more commonly analyzed cases of Italy, Spain, Greece, and the U.K.

The authors reject the culturalist argument that clientelism is peculiar to certain societies and cultures, an argument they associate with Robert Putnam in *Making Democracy Work*. Those in favor of the culturalist position stress that certain groups and societies have developed to a greater extent than others an ethic of particularism, which legitimates clientelist politics, thus increasing government staff and state spending. In contrast, Piattoni and her colleagues endorse a neoinstitutionalist analysis based on the economic aspects of clientelist exchange. While Shefter relies on the supply side of clientelism (as controlled and used by political parties), these authors suggest that equal attention be paid to the demand side of clientelism (as a strategy for those willing to accede to resources). They nevertheless bring culture back into the analysis, since the structure of demands is grounded on individual and group preferences that are far from contingent and vary across polities and sectors.

With this qualification, their institutionalist perspective is important for future studies of clientelism. It stresses the demand side in clientelism, which has hitherto been downgraded in favor of the strategies of actual and potential patrons and brokers. As the authors indicate, instead of contrasting clientelism to civil society, it can be viewed as one of various strategies stemming from civil society. While liberal society and clientelism stand apart in Weberian ideal-typical terms of citizenship and distribution barriers, real world situations have various identifiable patterns of patronage and clientelism, as indicated in the case studies and summed up in a table (see Table 1). While an advance over earlier dichotomies of traditional and modern patronage, the typological bias of this approach needs to be viewed critically, as it condenses rich histories of clientelism into Weberian ideal-types that are constructed impressionistically. Future studies could overcome this bias by disaggregating the component facets of clientelism and tracking for analysis selected aspects, such as its impact on voting and the particularistic use of public budgets.

**How Do We Conduct Politics?**

Another major line of research concerns political practice. It is illustrated by Auyero's book and the book edited by Briquet and Sawicki. The latter is both less ambitious and more global in its span than Piattoni's. According to the editors, it aims to relate existing theoretical approaches on clientelism, elaborated mainly in the 1980s and early 1990s, to middle range explanations of clientelistic practices in the specific situations of different societies. Its scope spans European and non-European cases. It focuses, among
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Table 1 Classification of Idealized and Real Systems of Interest Representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barriers to Citizenship</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barriers to Citizenship</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>[Clientelism]</td>
<td>&quot;Continental&quot; Patronage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barriers to Universal Distribution</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>&quot;English-style&quot; patronage</td>
<td>Interest-group liberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Consociationalism</td>
<td>Corporatism</td>
<td>[Liberal democracy]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 According to the author, categories under parentheses represent the idealized models of clientelism on the one end of the spectrum, and liberal democracy, on the other. Standing in between are the various patterns of interest representation that crystallized de facto, and which have structured citizenship and access to distribution in varied ways and extents.

other subjects, on political trends in France under the Third Republic and French political parties, popular practices and democratic transitions in Benin and Brazil, associations supporting Japanese politicians, and localism and political practices in Italy.

These contributions point out an important facet of politics: personal political ties remain a central aspect of politics in contemporary societies. Their rationale blends rational calculation with the logic of gift giving and receiving, personal commitments, and seduction. While on the verge of delegitimization and the focus of moralistic attacks, these practices may flourish nonetheless, especially under administrative ineffectiveness and the persistence of personalized politics.

While in nineteenth century France notables could register and quantify their distributive largesse toward clients and political brokers and boast of their prominence in terms of patronage, in the twentieth century clientelism has become more concealed and blurred. In developing countries, such as Benin, clientelistic practices link the moral economy of power with apprenticeship in negotiation and experimentation with the rules of pluralism. Within the framework of redemocratization and electoral pluralism, clientelism became a chosen avenue for Brazilian individuals opting between alternative patrons increasingly prepared to supply the rising demands of citizens, in what Christopher Clapham once characterized as "clientelism of representation." In societies such as Benin and Brazil citizens are willing to accept some corruption as long as the rising patrons and brokers stand by their word and deliver services, both individually and collectively. Electoral politics in these contexts continues to expand the conception of the personal generosity of the political person.

Frédéric Sawicki’s study of party clientelism in France highlights the shortcomings of many analyses that seek to identify the presence or absence of clientelism. Sawicki indicates that the scant research on clientelism in France (compared to Italy) is due less to actual processes than to the moralistic imagery shaped by the French state, which was comparatively successful in projecting its statist logic upon society. According to the author, the normative view lumped clientelism and party financing together with ban-
ditry, political clans, and corruption. It thus impeded a more distanced analysis of what Sawicki and Briquet call “pratiques officieuses” (informal practices reaching out to the formal frameworks of state power).

In addition, Sawicki calls attention to the need to conduct nuanced research into the fate of different forms of clientelism, some of which may flourish while others decline. He shows that, while France has been less prone than Italy to clientelism by notables or parties, a third pattern of institutional clientelism has developed, at least since the 1880s. This pattern is characterized by political mobilization at the subnational level, the personalization of political competition, connections between majors and the administration, and personalized personnel appointments. This form of clientelism derives its logic from an institutional matrix that favors an ambiguous trade-off between the increasing autonomy of national public functions and the territorially decentralized control of local appointments and promotions. Sawicki adds that under the Fifth Republic a parallel and huge source of patronage has been placed in the hands of the president and the ministers. Instead of looking at the rise and decline of patronage and clientelism as a litmus test for modernization, these new studies call for research on the ways patronage and clientelism are patterned and on their relative reinforcement or weakening under different political circumstances.

This line of analysis is fine-tuned in Auyero’s book on clientelistic networks among shantytown dwellers in the province of Buenos Aires, Argentina. Auyero, an anthropologist, shows how clientelistic problem solving is sustained by a structure of feeling and a state of mind tied to Peronist brokerage. For the residents of the shantytowns personalized political mediation is one means among others to provide acute subsistence needs. Other means include salaries (extremely low or part-time), networks of reciprocity, church charity, and underground activities such as drug dealing, shoplifting, and other crimes. The distribution of material resources is a necessary but in itself insufficient condition for the smooth operation of the clientelistic link.

The material benefits distributed by acts of giving and local brokers’ caring actions are experienced as supporting a long-term commitment, within an ethics of cooperation, companionship, and solidarity. These relationships have been imbued in the parallel ideological environment of Peronist imagery with its populist mythology and pantheon of heroes and saints, primarily Evita. The networks themselves have therefore become legitimate, “independent of this or that particular broker or patron.” One of the central claims of the book, rooted in a symbolic performative perspective inspired by Pierre Bourdieu, is that actual practice and mental frames of mind are mutually constitutive.

The social and mental structures of political clientelism are “interlinked by a twofold relationship of mutual constitution and correspondence.” Within inner circles, the distribution of material resources is important. Clients are, undoubtedly, interested actors. But interest cannot be taken as the actual cause—the generative principle—of clients' behaviors. Reciprocity and calculation exist, but demands for recognition within the inner circle are more significant. The emphasis that inner-circle members place on their “friendship” with their brokers and on the affective ties so contracted hints at the mean-
ings that emerge and sustain these ties: clients’ desires to be cared for and recognized should be considered the central cause of their behavior.50

Democratic polities leave room and new opportunities for political articulation, negotiation, and public positioning. The politics of identity and the decline of ideological mobilization can provide a favorable ground for clientelistic articulation. Therefore, personalized politics and a politics of collective identity, for example, as shaped under the Peronist banner, are not contradictory.51 Still, on a macro level the clientelistic networks depicted by Auyero did not promote public goods and the collective well-being of the shantytown’s residents. Rather, clientelism maintained the general skewed structure of income and opportunities open to these lower-class citizens, perpetuating poverty, underdevelopment, and dependency.

Clientelism’s Institutional Viability

Researchers differ in their assessment of the institutional viability and significance of clientelism and patronage in contemporary polities. On the one hand, political mediation and brokerage, whether of a more open and generalizable or a more closed and individualized character, should continue to play a major role in contemporary political institutions. On the other hand, debate continues on how to conceptualize the presence of clientelist mediation and patron brokerage, specifically on whether the particularistic distribution of benefits is or is not compatible with the manifest principles of modern constitutional democracy and mass party politics.52

A recent World Bank position paper brings the issue into full relief. While it acknowledges the negative connotations of patronage, it concedes that it may serve positive functions. Nonetheless, it is hard to draw the exact line between “good” and “bad” appointments and find an appropriate balance.

Patronage suggests the transgression of real or perceived boundaries of legitimate political influence, the violation of principles of merit and competition in civil service recruitment and promotion. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that governments the world-over accept that some political appointments are fully legitimate. A small number of these appointments are justified as a means for political leaders to fashion a circle of government policymakers and managers who share a common agenda. Patronage is clearly a problem. . . .53

Meritocratic principles need to be reconciled with a political logic, particularly but not only in multiparty, pluralist, and multiethnic governmental coalitions. The problem is not merely the entry or promotion of unqualified individuals in the public administration. In contemporary polities, most clientelistic intercessions operate above the fulfillment of minimal capacity requirements for entry into the administration. Nor does it concern merely the danger of institutional ineffectiveness due to staffing changes,
which may have “a crippling effect on institutional memory,” as suggested in the World Bank document. A clientelistic organizational environment hampers institutional learning and sedimentation, as it may generate high turnover of personnel. However, patronage does not necessarily promote higher turnover than other institutions, such as proportional representation with coalitional rule. Clientelism should also not be conflated with inefficiency. Different forms and degrees of efficiency and inefficiency can be traced in different cases of clientelism. Beyond these institutional consequences, the principal issue is whether clientelism and patronage affect the principles of modern constitutional democracy, for example, by sliding into what could be called systemic corruption, which cripples institutional trust and public confidence in the political system and in projects that otherwise could empower citizens.

The defining line seems to be the effectiveness of those institutional mechanisms through which citizens can press for their rights and entitlements in terms of a general interest, against institutional discrimination. For instance, nonpartisan public systems, civil service guidelines especially in selection procedures, controls over party fundraising, recognized charters of rights, nonpartisan state comptrollers, particularly in auditing practices, and ombudspersons can operate as trustworthy mechanisms of government in removing institutional discrimination and enhancing public accountability.

Future research will have to analyze what makes these mechanisms effective. Indeed, works on clientelism reveal that the modernization of these institutional mechanisms may merely lead to their use in power struggles, for example, by enforcing guidelines selectively against those falling out of favor or by discrediting rival political forces. Studies of modernization of the news media have shown that in countries such as Spain, Italy, and Mexico changes in technology and organizational frameworks have not diminished the politicization of the media. The media continue to be associated with selective enforcement of the law and public defamation.

Social forces and coalitions may resent, criticize, and oppose clientelism and wish to curtail it in favor of bureaucratic universalism and market rationality, but sectors benefiting from clientelistic brokerage and patronage see it pragmatically, as useful for advancement in competitive social, economic, and political domains.

This duality reflects a major tension of modern democratic polities, which are built on citizenship and political equality but leave the economic domain open to inequalities and substantial socioeconomic gaps. This duality may explain the paradoxical flourishing of clientelistic networks under macroeconomic adjustment and restructuring. Liberalization, reduction of state intervention in favor of market mechanisms, privatization of state-owned and state-supported services, and curtailment of union power further fragment society and heighten the need for support networks.

Within these parameters, clientelism is highly adaptive to changing market logics, individualistic strategies, and capitalistic considerations, while at the same time it can be tuned to the agenda of politicians, brokers, and citizens willing to make claims on
grounds other than their only partially realized citizenship. Thus, when projected as a strategic political tool by brokers and political agents, clientelism has remained important during periods of political and economic revamping in such societies as Russia, Poland, Turkey, Brazil, and Argentina.

Brazil is a good example of reclientelization, a major subject for future studies. During military rule, between the mid 1960s and the early 1980s, the political arena was relatively closed, and politicians were forced to join one of the two umbrella parties recognized by the military rulers. The leverage of individual political mediation and informal negotiation was reduced. In the transition back to democracy, following state elections in 1982, governors were empowered, and local political machines once again became politically important. The full impact of clientelism was felt with the return to civilian rule in 1985. Political jobbery and state budgets became means of amassing political support and negotiating political agreements, especially between the executive and parliamentarians. As long as Brazilian presidents did not overly personalize the use of patronage resources, like Fernando Collor de Mello, the first Brazilian president to be impeached on charges of corruption in 1992, the system continued to work effectively. Interactions among the federal, state, and municipal levels allowed clientelistic networks to flourish alongside more innovative avenues of empowerment of civil society. The latter were conducted within the framework of the reformed constitution of 1988, which led to restructuring in the provision of public services and to local initiatives of participatory budgeting. The federal government and federal agencies were forced to intervene in the subnational arena only where evidence of administrative malfunctioning was extreme, for example, in some of the state banks. But, in general, new and old political styles coexisted and fostered federal coalitional stability for most of the 1990s. Even President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who attempted to institutionalize the delivery of state resources to communal levels and citizen participation in the supervision and use of public resources in health and education, admitted he spent much time in negotiations with parliamentarians and allowed them to control personal budgeting in order to further long-term effectiveness in lawmaking and administration. Public budgets continued to be appropriated and delivered selectively by politicians in various Brazilian states, turning some of them into political fiefs, albeit under varied leadership styles and political orientation.

Future Directions

The field of clientelism is vast, and the forms of clientelistic networks are diverse and hidden from public eyes, thus requiring a combination of comparative politics and field studies. Moreover, since it is at the crossroads of politics, administration, markets, and society, the study of clientelism poses challenges of cross-disciplinary cooperation and varied disciplinary expertise.
Despite substantial analytical advances, debate continues to center on its place and significance in contemporary and historical polities. Further research will be necessary to resolve some of the issues. The systematic analysis of the contextual variables associated with clientelism and patronage in modern democracies is, perhaps surprisingly, still in its beginnings. A series of issues still needs rigorous analysis.

What are the boundaries for analyzing clientelism? Should its study be confined to states or broadened to account for transnational trends? Is it worth tracing a vertical axis through political levels and beyond the boundaries of states and nation-states? “When UK Ministers go to Brussels and lobby for UK fishermen, aren’t they playing clientelist politics in supra-national institutions?”61 Most studies of clientelism concentrate on intrastate analysis of political and administrative articulation. Perhaps political science should devote more systematic attention to transnational clientelistic forms and networks of dependency.62

Is it worth establishing a continuum based on the size of the recipient, from individuals through groups to classes? Peter Flynn indicated once that even though clientelism has often been described as curbing and discouraging class mobilization, they may coincide and coexist in terms of power, control, and benefits.63 David Coates suggests that in class terms, behind the façade of democratic politics, there is much class clientelism.

There is indirectly—in the form of excluding policies that, say, equalize incomes; but there is also directly, in the form of tax breaks and the like. And of course there are huge patronage networks inside military-industrial complexes, revolving door systems of appointment and so on. . . . That seems to be a horizontal axis, on which it might be possible to map out a range of relationships labelled ‘clientelistic,’ while showing that they are not qualitatively different in kind from other forms of class-power linkage (lobbying, Bonapartism and so on).64

What is the current structural location of clientelism? Robin Theobald observed that in postindustrial societies patronage becomes more “classified,” that is, it tends to proliferate among those with professional and business qualifications in the upper strata, rather than remaining a phenomenon typical of individuals of the lower classes in search of a benefactor.65 Thus, clientelism can not be confined to politics in a restricted sense. It proliferates in the arts, academia, religious congregations, the media, and business, wherever there is the power to appoint and grant access to benefits, goods, services, influence, and honors.66

Why does patronage, as measured through politically motivated nominations in the public administration, seem to dwindle under personalist styles of presidentialism? Despite the widespread presumption that clientelism and personalism are positively correlated, Jorge Gordin’s analysis of patronage in Latin American polities between 1960 and 1994 suggests that personalist leaders are less compelled to divide up state resources and jobs as partisan spoils, perhaps as their support is more generalized than that of supporting clienteles.
How does clientelism affect political competition? There are suggestions, still unsubstantiated, that clientelism depresses electoral competition and increases the chance that incumbent patrons will win by wide margins or lose by a narrow margin.68

How are patterns of clientelism related to different political systems? How do proportional representation and consociationalism and majoritarian systems affect the use of patronage? How do parliamentarian systems compare with presidentialist systems? How do federal and unitary countries differ in their patterns of clientelism and patronage? Common sense suggests that federal systems leave greater leeway for political clientelism than unitary systems, since such networks can articulate different political, social, and administrative levels. Examples include Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Argentina, compared to unitary countries such as Costa Rica and Uruguay in Latin America. However, this trend does not apply to Chile and Ecuador and may not hold true in Europe, for example, in Germany compared to Portugal and Greece.69

Are the dimensions of a country and its correlated administrative structure important factors for clientelism? Large federal countries are likely to develop alternative political styles. This plurality in itself constrains the different styles, as seen in Canada and the U.S., in contrast to more compact polities, whether authoritarian like Taiwan or more democratic like Jamaica.70 In both Jamaica and Taiwan the consolidation of dominant political patterns had a strong component of deep-seated clientelism and weak countervailing forces and alternative political styles.71 By contrast, in Canada and the U.S., clientelism was one political style among many others, such as the traditional left, traditional conservatism, new fiscal populism, and reform. It therefore remained a minority or marginal political culture that became important only in certain periods, regions (Nova Scotia and other Maritime provinces in Canada), cities (Chicago for most of the twentieth century), and social sectors (Catholics and recent immigrants but not Protestants in the U.S.).72

How does clientelism affect policy preferences? The inflationary character of expectations in patronage-ridden polities seems connected to fiscal liberalism (expanding public expenditure), as opposed to fiscal austerity. Data collected by Terry N. Clark and the Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation project seem to confirm this connection, but despite this huge effort at systematization accurate measurement of clientelism has proved elusive.73 Clark recently suggested measuring differences in governments’ functional responsibilities and the structure of demands (city size, density, poverty, crime) as they affect the pattern of clientelism.74 Quantitative research on the impact and correlates of clientelism should be combined with qualitative analyses of its operations and ambiguities and the political strategies of forces working for and against it in different contemporary polities.
NOTES

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2. The terms originated in ancient republican Rome and found their way into the vernacular languages of Mediterranean and Latin American societies. They are a source of dissonance and ambiguity in the English-speaking world. The terms “clientelism,” “patron-client relationships,” and “patronage” are now widely accepted.


12. Willerton; Roniger and Güneş-Ayata, eds.
16. Equally challenging is Pablo José Torres, Votos, chapas y fideos: Clientelismo político y ayuda social (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 2002).
18. Mario Caciagli, Clientelismo, corrupción y criminalidad organizada (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1997).
24. Luis Fernando Medina and Susan Stokes, “Clientelism as Political Monopoly” (2002), http://www.kellog.northwestern.edu. There is a problem with some of the assumptions in this otherwise interesting paper. It confuses clientelistic control with a monopolist market situation. Characteristically, most contemporary forms of clientelist control are not monopolist. They are fragile, due to pressures from countervailing political forces in competitive market structures. See also Valeria Brusco, Marcelo Nazareno, and Susan C. Stokes, “Clientelism and Democracy: Evidence from Argentina,” Conference on Political Parties and Legislative Organization in Parliamentary and Presidential Regimes, Yale University, March 2002.


29. Auyero, p. 117.


34. Ibid., p. 18.


37. Ibid., pp. 44–45.

38. Ibid., pp. 48–49, 53.


40. Ibid., pp. 75–76.


43. Piattoni, ed., p. 204.


49. Auyero, p. 178.


54. A good corrective is to look at the variable effects of clientelism worldwide, for example, broadening discretion in Latin America, while reducing it in Japan. Luis Roniger, “Coronelismo, Caciquismo and Oyabun-kobun: Divergent Implications of Hierarchical Trust in Brazil, Mexico and Japan,” British Journal of Sociology, 38 (1987), 310–30.


56. For example, Juan Villalonga in Spain, Berlusconi in Italy, and the journal El Universal in Mexico in Daniel Hallin and Stylianos Papathanassopoulos, “Political Clientelism and the Media,” Media, Culture and Society, 24 (2002), 175–96.

57. Even those who benefit from patronage may criticize it in formal terms of impartiality and universalism, although they relegate the latter to the realm of ideals, of a “dream-world.” Graham, “Clientelismo na cultura politica brasileira.”


64. Coates.


68. Medina and Stokes, “Clientelism as Political Monopoly.”


74. Terry Nichols Clark, personal communication, November 5, 2002.